Since the Asian crisis, ASEAN5 countries have expended considerable effort in trying to develop their domestic bond markets. Yet today these markets are not much larger, relative to GDP, than they were a decade before. How can we explain this? And does this mean that domestic markets have not, in fact, developed? The paper argues that bond market growth has been held back by a sharp fall in investment rates, which has left firms with little need for bond borrowing. Even so, markets have developed in other ways, to such an extent that substantial amounts of foreign portfolio investment have begun to flow into ASEAN5 bonds. These developments have important ramifications. With the investor base growing and infrastructure investment likely to rise, ASEAN5 bond markets could expand rapidly over the next decade, holding out the prospect that the region could finally achieve "twin engine" financial systems. JEL Classification Numbers: D4, D53, E44, E58, F36, G1, G3
I. INTRODUCTION
It has now been a decade since ASEAN launched a major effort to develop its domestic bond markets. 1 That makes it a good time to take stock, to see what has been accomplished and what still remains to be done. This paper attempts to do just that.
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A number of other papers have undertaken such an effort. But there are two important differences between most of these efforts and the current study. First, most of the other studies cast a much wider net, focusing either on bond markets in Emerging Asia as a whole, or on the ASEAN+3. This study focuses exclusively on the ASEAN5, that is to say Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
Second, there are large differences in perspective between this paper and most other studies. Most other papers come to relatively pessimistic conclusions. They note, in particular, that corporate bond markets have not expanded relative to GDP, and conclude that little progress has therefore been made. That is the essence of the argument made by Mieno et. al. (2009) . Spiegel (2009) goes even further, expressing doubts about some of the premises underlying the reforms, including the argument propounded by Greenspan (1999) that capital markets can act as a "spare tire" in case the banking system becomes impaired. He claims that this theory has largely been discredited. Nor is Spiegel optimistic about the future, wondering instead whether Asia's bond markets will fade, now that the risk tolerance of the boom years has ended. This paper reaches very different conclusions. It argues that two critical changes have taken place: bond markets have developed to the point where they have begun to serve as a spare tire in case other parts of the financial system are impaired; and where foreign investors are now eager to expand their investments in local currency fixed income assets. These developments have important ramifications. With the investor base likely to expand as foreign investors devote an increasing portion of their portfolios to emerging market assets, ASEAN5 bond markets could grow much more rapidly over the coming decade, to the point where ASEAN5 could finally develop "twin engine" financial systems. To seize this opportunity, however, pro-active policies will be necessary, both to smooth the development path and minimize the attendant risks, such as market volatility.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section recalls why this initiative was so important to ASEAN, and outlines the sweeping reforms that countries have introduced. Section three addresses the puzzle of why, despite these efforts, ASEAN5 bond markets have not expanded relative to GDP. Section four then focuses on other metrics of development, arguing that these suggest that a remarkable transformation of ASEAN bond markets is in 1 ASEAN refers to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. ASEAN+3 includes China, Japan, and Korea. 2 This and a companion paper ("Developing ASEAN5 Bond Markets: What Still Needs to be Done?") were presented to an ASEAN5 Deputy Governors' seminar held in Bangkok on November 5, 2010. The final versions benefit from discussion during that seminar and subsequent comments from the ASEAN5 central banks. The authors wish to express their gratitude for this helpful input. fact underway. Section five considers some of the implications of this transformation. Section six concludes.
II. WHY DEVELOP BOND MARKETS?
Across the globe, emerging markets have placed great emphasis on developing their bond markets in recent years. Why have they done so? Essentially, because the financial sector plays a vital economic role, by channeling funds from those who are saving to those who are investing. The more efficiently it performs this function, the lower the cost of capital will be to the real sector, the faster the economy will grow, and the sooner living standards will reach advanced country levels.
What is true for financial markets as a whole applies to bond markets in particular.
That's because bond markets can play an especially important role in financing large investment projects. Such projects tend to be risky and take time before they yield returns, characteristics that make investors reluctant to finance them. But bond markets can spread these risks over a large number of holders of securities. Moreover, because bond contracts (unlike loans) are designed to be traded, they allow investors to transfer the risks to others when they feel the need to do so, even before the projects are completed. The combination of these two characteristics -the scope for risk-sharing and risk-shedding -means that bond investors are much more willing to make large, long-term commitments than banks, which are constrained by limits on how much maturity transformation they can engage in.
In addition, bond markets are well-suited for furthering regional development. Indeed, a prime factor behind the development of bond finance in the United States a century ago was that it allowed savings in the more mature economy of the east coast to be channeled to meet the demands of the developing west coast economy, in a way which the banking system could not. The same may now be true, mutatis mutandis, for the ASEAN countries. Bond markets face fewer constraints to cross-border flows than banks: there are no foreign exchange open position limits, no maturity mismatch limits, nor any capital requirements, all of which (appropriately) apply to depository institutions.
Beyond these general principles, there are particular reasons why ASEAN has put so much emphasis on developing bond markets over the past decade. These reasons stem from the consensus diagnosis of what happened in 1997. According to this view, the crisis could be traced in large part to several underlying problems in ASEAN's financial systems:
Finance systems were extremely bank-centric, which meant that most of the financial risks were being concentrated in the banking system -and there was no alternate channel of intermediation that could be used if the banks once again encountered difficulty. 

Borrowing had suffered from a double mismatch, since long-term domestically oriented investment projects were being funded through short-term and foreign currency borrowing.
 Countries in the region were perceived to be excessively dependent on volatile capital inflows, a situation that struck many observers as ironic since the region had an abundance of domestic saving.
Observers further argued that all three of these problems could be solved by developing domestic bond markets. Vibrant bond markets would create another financing channel, a spare tire that firms could use in case banks once again encountered difficulties. And because domestic bonds would be long-term and in local currencies, they would eliminate the double mismatch problem. Finally, with more active domestic bond markets, firms could reduce their dependence on foreign capital markets.
Based on this diagnosis, ASEAN has put considerable effort over the past decade into developing its bond markets. The ASEAN+3 created the Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI), which established several working groups to study the issues and make recommendations. The Asian Development Bank also established a study program, and created Asia Bonds Online so that researchers and market participants could easily find key information about local currency markets.
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The Executives' Meeting of East Asia Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP) created pan-Asian bond funds to facilitate regional investment.
For a review of ASEAN's reform efforts, see the companion paper, "Developing ASEAN5 Domestic Bond Markets: What Still Needs to be Done?" But just to take two examples, characteristic of the reforms around the region:

The Philippines introduced a new Securities Regulation Code (SRC), institutionalized delivery-versus payment through a Real Time Gross Settlement System (RTGS), and launched an inter-dealer platform to encourage exchange trading of fixed income instruments.
 Malaysia has established a facilitative regulatory environment, including Foreign Exchange Administration rules that include no withholding tax, no capital gains tax, and no restrictions on investing in Malaysian ringgit bonds. In addition, a wide range of foreign exchange and interest rate hedging instruments have been introduced, contributing to the deepening and growing sophistication of the Malaysian bond market.
Despite these sweeping reforms, however, ASEAN5 bond markets have not grown, relative to GDP. For most of the past decade the stock of local currency bonds outstanding has fluctuated around roughly 50 percent of regional GDP.
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As a result, ASEAN5 has not been able to expand its share in the emerging markets bond universe. A decade ago, ASEAN5's domestic debt accounted for about one-fifth of total emerging market domestic debt securities, excluding those from China; today, the fraction is exactly the same. If the rapidly developing bond market in China were to be included amongst the emerging market total, ASEAN5's share would have fallen, to about one-tenth.
Why haven't ASEAN5 bond markets grown? In part, because the bulk of ASEAN5 local currency bonds-around 35 percent of GDP-are issued by governments. And for most of the past decade budget deficits remained low, so there was little need for them to issue additional debt. But even the size of the corporate bond markets has remained remarkably stable, hovering around just 15-18 percent of GDP. This presents a profound puzzle. Why haven't corporate debt markets expanded? And does that mean they have not really developed? Let's take these questions in turn.
III. WHY HAVEN'T CORPORATE BOND MARKETS EXPANDED?
At the outset of ASEAN's push to develop bond markets, some observers hoped that the region could follow the same path as Latin America. In that region, bond markets had been propelled forward by the rapid development of contractual savings schemes, such as pension funds. As these schemes expanded, their demand for long-term domestic currency assets increased, which in turn encouraged firms to respond by issuing more bonds. But this dynamic failed to materialize in the ASEAN5. To understand why, consider first the demand side of the market, that is to say the investor base. Has it failed to develop? At the same time, firms found alternative ways to fund their investment projects. As part of the post-Asian crisis changes, firms strove to increase their profitability, and succeeded in doing so. They were consequently able to fund a much larger portion of their diminished investment needs from their own internal cash generation. At the same time, the crisis also led to a shift in the types of investment, away from construction, which is typically financed by borrowing; and towards manufacturing for export, which is financed in a much wider variety of ways. In particular, ASEAN manufacturing companies tend to finance themselves through equity, including direct equity investments. Teranishi, Fukuda, and Liu (2007) found that companies from Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia rely for their long-term funding much more heavily on equity finance and -strikingly -much less on banks, than do corporations in advanced countries. Mieno (2009) found that capital accounts represented 53 percent of the balance sheet for listed Malaysian corporations, while bank borrowing accounted for only 14 percent; the figures for Thai corporations were similar. Unsurprisingly, then, aggregate figures for the ASEAN5 show that equities account for nearly two-thirds of corporate domestic financing, with bank credit and bonds splitting the remainder.
A further important structural factor is the large role played, within the manufacturing sector, by foreign-invested companies. In a series of studies Mieno et. al. (2008 Mieno et. al. ( , 2009 have argued that since the mid-1980s, when ASEAN became an increasingly important base for multinational manufacturing production, foreign corporations have become an increasingly important funding channel for local companies. Mieno notes, for example, that half of the major 1,100 listed and non-listed corporations in Thailand now have foreign ownership participation. And he finds that the higher the share of foreign ownership, the lower the reliance on bank lending. Instead, these firms tend to rely on internal funding from their parent corporations.
Summing up, the expansion of the domestic investor base created an opening for ASEAN5 corporate bond markets. But firms failed to seize this opportunity, because they had little need to issue over the past decade. Does this failure to expand mean that markets have not developed? Not at all. Development has many dimensions, and on many of these metrics, progress is clear. In fact, ASEAN5 markets have been fundamentally transformed. 
IV. A FUNDAMENTAL TRANSFORMATION
To track this transformation, we consider first some case studies, which enable us to see clear links between policy initiatives and market development. From this, we proceed to a firm level analysis, to assess whether, in a well-defined sense, it has become easier for firms to access ASEAN5 corporate bond markets. Then, we consider two of the more dramatic manifestations of the transformation. Specifically, the corporate bond market has developed into a "spare tire" that corporates can use when other parts of the financial system come under stress, while foreign investors have become eager to purchase domestic bonds.
A. Case Studies of Development
Consider again the size of ASEAN5's bond markets. While these markets may not have expanded over the past decade, they nonetheless remain quite sizeable in some cases. According to BIS data, the local currency markets in Thailand and Singapore are reasonably large for EMs, while Malaysia's market is larger than most.
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These markets also boast a sophisticated infrastructure. (See Developing ASEAN5 Domestic Bond Markets: What Still Needs to be Done?) In view of the analysis in Section III, one could turn the original question on its head and ask how these countries managed to sustain such large and sophisticated bond markets in the face of shrinking investment. The answer lies in policy initiatives. Malaysia's market has been boosted by efforts to promote the issuance of Islamic bonds (Box 1), while Singapore has managed to overcome its relatively narrow domestic issuer base by encouraging overseas firms to issue in the local currency market (Box 2).
. 
Box 1. Malaysia's Islamic Bond Market
Over the past decade, Malaysia has developed a burgeoning market in sukuk, or shari'ah-compliant bonds. Unlike conventional bonds with fixed coupon payments, sukuk are structured as participation certificates that provide investors with a share of asset returns, making them compatible with the Islamic prohibition of interest payments. As a result, they have become increasingly popular, both domestically and amongst investors from other Islamic nations. The stock of sukuk as a ratio to GDP has doubled since 2001, exceeding 28 percent by 2008. This expansion has given Malaysia a dominant position in the global market, with Malaysian issuances accounting for more than two-thirds of the total $130 billion sukuk outstanding.
This success has been rooted in an array of policy initiatives. In 2000, the government laid out a ten-year Capital Market Master Plan for developing the bond market, both sukuk and conventional. Subsequently: 

The government has also provided assistance in placing sukuk via the Malaysia International Islamic Financial Centre (MIFC).
The private sector (including state-owned enterprises) has responded to these incentives with alacrity. Sukuks now account for more than half the private debt securities outstanding, double their share of a decade ago. However, the expansion of this market has not been enough to compensate for the shrinkage of the conventional bond market (measured relative to GDP). As a result, the overall ratio of corporate bonds to GDP has actually declined by about 10 percentage points since 2001, to 38 percent of GDP, mainly because investment has fallen sharply over this period, reducing the need for bond finance. Finally, foreign issuers are attracted by the fact that Singapore is an international financial center, with a large investor base, including foreign asset managers, insurance companies, banks, and private banks.
---------------B. Firm-Level Analysis
In any case, market development cannot be measured solely on the basis of size. Two of the most important alternative measures are concentration and significance, where the latter refers to the size of issues as a proportion of firm balance sheets. Measured this way, bond market development can be conceived as following a certain pattern. Initially, when the market is at a very early stage, only a few firms will be large enough or financially wellregarded enough (with a long track record and audited public accounts) to issue. Moreover, because there are sizeable fixed costs to issuing bonds, and because firms want to establish liquid benchmark issues, the size of these initial issues is normally large relative to firm balance sheets. But over time, as markets and economies develop, concentration ratios tend to fall. Markets will no longer be dominated by a few large issuers, or a few large bond issues, since more and more firms are able to issue. In addition, the significance of bond issues will also tend to decline, partly because as issuance becomes routine, firms will tend to issue frequent smaller amounts rather than occasional large amounts and because these minimum amounts will become small relative to the size of growing balance sheets.
The process can be depicted graphically as follows:
Bond Market Development Matrix
Initially, the market starts off in the second quadrant, with high concentrations (in this diagram, the concentration of issuers) and high significance. But gradually as the market develops, it moves into the third quadrant, with low concentration and low significance. In these two markets, one can see some clear progress: the amount of issuance has been increasing steadily; the number of issues and issuers has increased sharply; and with the influx of new issues, the average maturity has shortened.
At the same time, progress in reducing concentration and significance (of individual issues) has been mixed. On the positive side, concentration -whether measured by issuance (e.g., a few large bonds) or by issuers (e.g., a few large companies) -in Malaysia is now down to the levels of Brazil and Korea. But concentration in other countries remains high. Similarly, the significance of new issues (issuance relative to balance sheet size) has diminished in Malaysia to the levels of the most advanced emerging markets, but remains high in other countries.
The two metrics interact in the expected way. For example, controlling for concentration, the Philippines and Malaysia tend to have higher levels of significance. That is to say, the average issuance volume relative to issuer balance sheets is higher in countries with less developed bond markets, as the theory would predict. 7 Bond issuance (and balance sheet information (total assets)) data were obtained for five ASEAN countries as well as two emerging market comparator countries (Brazil and Korea). Bond issuance data include all local currency-denominated non-financial, private sector transactions during each sample year (2000, 2005, 2009 , and the first two quarters of 2010) as reported in Bloomberg and Dealogic. Note that issues by financial companies and Special Purpose Vehicles were excluded, in the latter case because these entities are levered financing vehicles, rather than operating companies. As a result, the sample size for Singapore is too small to be reliable. The bivariate density function plots the ratio of annual issuance over total assets (x-axis) over the relative share of individual total assets of each issuer (as a re-scaled HHI concentration measure, y-axis), which span the two-dimensional grid of joint probabilities (defined as the integral over the unit square In the figure, the center of each ellipse represents the peak of the joint probability distribution of concentration and significance. Meanwhile, the size of each ellipse represents the relative issuance volume (Indonesia has two ellipses because it has two peaks in its probability distribution. Singapore is excluded from the chart.)
The picture conveys the same message as the summary statistics. Over the past decade, ASEAN5 countries-and emerging markets in general-have developed, in the sense of moving towards the low concentration-low significance third quadrant. Currently, the state of development in Malaysia and Thailand is not all that far from Korea and Brazil -at least as measured by these dimensions. Even so, none of the ASEAN5 countries have firmly entered the third quadrant. So, more progress needs to be made in diversifying the issuer base, and ensuring that issuance becomes a more routine method of financing operations.
The conclusions of the firm-level analysis can be summed up simply. The amount of issuance has risen steadily, as has the number of issues. Moreover, there has been progress in reducing concentration. A decade ago, only the largest and best-known firms were able to issue bonds, so their issues dominated local markets. Gradually, however, more and more firms have been able to issue, creating broader markets than before. This qualitative progress has culminated in two critical developments.
C. The New Spare Tire
Amidst the depths of the global financial crisis, there was a sudden surge in domestic bond issuance by emerging Asian corporates. For years, the stock of Emerging Asian corporate bonds outstanding had been stagnating as a percent of GDP. But in the second quarter of 2009, the stock increased by nearly 10 percent q/q in the ASEAN5 and more than 20 percent q/q in emerging Asia excluding China. In the third quarter, there was a further large increase. By the end of the year, ASEAN5 local currency corporate bond issuance had reached a $58 billion, higher than the previous peak, reached in 2007, and roughly double the normal level.
This surge was striking for a number of reasons. To begin with, as noted in Section III, ASEAN5 corporates typically do not rely much on bond issuance for funding. Moreover, the surge took place in the middle of a severe recession, when private sector investment had fallen sharply. So, firms had little need to issue bonds in order to finance investment projects-they were not initiating new ones and they were slowing down the ones that were already underway. Nor were firms forced to issue bonds just to sustain themselves; corporate profitability actually held up reasonably well during the recession. 
So, what explains the issuance boom?
The primary factor appears to have been the behavior of local banks. Normally, bank-centered financial systems maintain their lending ties to their clients, even during difficult times. But this was not a normal downturn. Even though liquidity in the Asian banking systems was ample and capital adequacy was never in doubt, Asian banks nonetheless followed their Western peers and became more cautious after Lehman's bankruptcy. They tightened their lending standards and reduced their prime lending rates much more slowly and partially than the decline in policy and bond interest rates. Both measures encouraged firms to turn to the capital markets, while reducing their use of bank credit. In fact, adding the two sources of funding together, total credit to the corporate sector actually declined in the first half of 2009 in the ASEAN5 countries. So, the bond issuance was not "additional"-corporates were merely substituting one form of financing for another. In other words, the domestic bond market acted precisely as reformers had original hoped it would: it became the "spare tire" that corporations could use once the bank financing channel became impaired.
Two important caveats must be noted. First, as always, the bond market could be utilized only by larger companies. So, governments were compelled to step in to help SMEs, expanding programs that guarantee bank lending and providing funds directly through statecontrolled banks. Second, the bond market was not available when it was needed most. In fact, in the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, when the crisis was at its peak, market access effectively shut down. Still, it is striking that bond finance came back more quickly than bank finance, which started a sustained increase only in the second quarter of 2010.
Where was the demand for these bonds coming from? Much of the demand appears to have come from overseas, as global risk appetite began to revive with the stabilization of advanced country financial systems and as prospects in emerging markets appeared better than in the West. As a result, inflows into emerging market debt funds resumed in May 2009, and quickly reached levels approaching the peak of the 2005−07 global boom. In short, ASEAN5's domestic bond markets were able to become a spare tire during the Great Recession -one of the key original objectives --because of another accomplishment. Foreigners were now willing to purchase domestic currency bonds, reducing the risk that corporates would be forced to endure a currency mismatch in order to secure bond financing. 
D. The Rise of Foreign Investment
After the Asian crisis, Eichengreen and Hausman (1999) argued that emerging markets were beset by an "original sin". According to this theory, EM's would inevitably suffer from the double mismatch problem; there was nothing much that could be done. That is because foreign investors were wary of issuers from such countries. So, they were unwilling to purchase local currency bonds. The only way to convince them to provide the needed finance was to issue global bonds, denominated in foreign currency, bearing relatively short maturity, and subject to the legal jurisdiction of an overseas financial center. 
This model was based on the Latin


For example, in Thailand, which traditionally had only minimal foreign holders of its domestic bonds, overseas purchases in the third quarter of 2010 amounted to nearly $5 billion, double the purchases for the first two quarters combined.
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 Meanwhile, in September 2010, the Philippines raised $1 billion from its first global sale of peso-denominated bonds.
11
In this way, the government was able to enhance its debt investor profile, while improving participation by offshore investors in Philippine capital markets and providing overseas Filipinos with attractive and relatively safe alternative investment facilities.
Is this merely a cyclical phenomenon?
Certainly, the extraordinary surge in foreign bond purchases stems from the unusual nature of the global recovery, which combines exceptionally low interest rates in advanced countries with bright growth prospects in emerging markets. In particular, there seems to be a considerable amount of "hot money", flowing in to local currency bond markets in the expectation that the gains from the interest differential will be amplified by those from currency appreciation. Such inflows could easily subside or reverse once cyclical conditions change.
But more long-lasting structural factors are also at work. Foreign holdings of emerging market local currency bonds have actually been increasing for some time, starting well before the global crisis. By 2007, foreign holdings had passed 8 percent; by, 2008, they had reached 12 percent; and after a brief dip during the global crisis, they surged, to 18 percent by the end of 2010. As foreign purchases of domestic bonds have increased, issuance of foreign currency bonds has receded. The high-water mark of foreign currency corporate bonds came in 2002, when the amount outstanding reached 6 percent of ASEAN5 GDP, implying that more than one-third of total corporate bonds were denominated in foreign currency. But in the subsequent years, the share of foreign bonds gradually fell, so much so that by the first quarter of 2010, it amounted to one-fifth of the total.
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(That said, it should be noted that foreign currency corporate issuance, like that of domestic currency issuance, surged during 2009 and remained high in 2010).
What explains these developments? Two factors. One is the development of corporate bond markets themselves. As they have expanded (in nominal terms, even if not relative to GDP), and become more accessible, and liquid foreign investors have been much more interested in entering these markets. In addition, macroeconomic fundamentals have improved. In an empirical paper, Hausman and Panizza (2003) argued that the degree of original sin was positively related to the level of development (proxied by GDP per capita), the strength of macroeconomic fundamentals (inflation and government debt), exchange rate flexibility, and the size of the investor base.
14 Strikingly, ASEAN5 countries have made considerable progress along every one of these dimensions in recent years. In particular, economic fundamentals have improved to the point where in some ways they are now much stronger than in advanced nations, whose fiscal positions have deteriorated in the wake of the financial crisis. The average ASEAN5 government debt to GDP ratio is less than half the advanced country average, and the gap is only projected to widen in the coming years, as advanced country debt is projected by the IMF to climb further, reaching 108 percent of GDP by 2015. Yet long-term bond interest rates are higher in ASEAN5 countries, and prospects for currency appreciation arguably stronger.
This trend of improving relative fundamentals has applied to most emerging markets.
One simple metric of this improvement is the aggregate rating of the bonds in the J.P. Morgan emerging market debt indices. In the 1990s, the rating for the EMBIG index of sovereign and corporate foreign currency emerging market bonds hovered between BB and BB-for the entire decade. But starting in 2002, it began an upwards march, to the point where it has now reached BBB-.
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In fact, all three J.P. Morgan emerging market bond indices are now rated investment grade: the CEMBI (for corporate debt) is at BBB and the GBI-EM (for local currency debt) is rated A-. 
V. THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME
The ramifications of growing foreign participation are difficult to predict.
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Precisely because there has been little foreign investment in domestic markets until recently, there is very little empirical evidence on the benefits and costs of foreign participation in bond market development (Daniel, 2008) .
A. Developmental Benefits
Some potential benefits seem clear. To begin with, overseas firms could expand the investor base, compensating for the slow growth in traditional domestic investors, such as the contractual savings schemes. Indeed, the potential impact could be quite large. Market surveys by MSCI Barra and IMF (2010) indicate that global bond funds remain underweight emerging markets, providing scope for a continued stock adjustment into dedicated emerging market funds. And because global bond and hedge funds are very large relative to local bond markets, even a marginal increase in the weight of emerging markets in their portfolio could lead to a significant rise in demand.
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Over time, the shift in demand is likely to be much more than marginal. In fact, it is possible that emerging markets are now at the beginning of a secular trend, in which the share of emerging market assets in foreign portfolios will only grow, first as foreign investors gradually bring their portfolio weights up to the shares of these countries in the global economy, and as then these shares themselves rise, because of rapid growth. These trends are likely to be reinforced by the need of advanced country pension systems to improve their returns. In the U.S., the Pew Center on the States (2010) has estimated that there is a $1 trillion gap between the 17 Increasing foreign inflows also pose broader macroeconomic policy questions. But such issues are beyond the scope of the current paper, which focuses squarely on the implications for bond market development. 18 For example, IMF (2010) estimates that a 1 percentage point reallocation of global equity and debt securities held by G-4 real money investors, which amounts to about $50 trillion, would result in additional portfolio flows of $485 billion, larger than the record annual portfolio flows to emerging markets of $424 billion recorded in 2007. Assuming that half of these inflows are allocated to debt (as has been the case recently), and that the debt flows are allocated proportionately to the bond stocks (excluding China), the ASEAN5 countries could receive an additional $50 billion in investments per year. $3.4 trillion in pension, health care and other retirement benefits that states have promised their workers and the $2.4 trillion that they have set aside to pay for them. The need to close this gap will put growing pressure on pension funds -which currently invest little in emerging market debt -to increase their allocations, especially since the yields on such debt exceed the U.S. rates by a wide margin.
Intra-regional flows are compounding flows received from outside Asia. Some regional central banks have started buying their neighbors' financial assets in a bid to diversify reserve holdings, achieve a better risk-return profile, and contain sterilization costs. Individual investors have also been investing in Asian bonds through local mutual funds. Thai investors, for example, have in recent years been large accumulators of Korean bonds, while in the past two years the net purchases of Korean bonds by investors from other Asian countries (excluding Thailand) have actually exceeded purchases from the U.S.
Additional foreign demand could help reduce bond yields (IMF, 2005).
To estimate how large this effect could be, Peiris (2010) employs a panel data framework to estimate the impact of foreign participation in determining long-term local currency government bond yields in a group of 10 emerging markets from 2000-09. 19 This analysis suggests that greater foreign inflows do reduce government yields, after controlling for other domestic and external factors including global interest rates and risk aversion. This effect is reasonably large, with a 10 percentage point increase in the share of bonds held by foreign investors generating a decline in yields of about 60 basis points.
Greater foreign participation will also improve liquidity. The larger the number of participants, the greater the diversity of preferences and views, which leads to more trading, better price discovery, and more efficient markets. Foreign participants are particularly beneficial for liquidity, since they are much more likely to trade domestic securities than domestic institutional investors, who typically follow buy-and-hold strategies. Case studies conducted by the World Bank and IMF (2001) on government bond markets in both emerging and mature markets confirm this effect qualitatively. The relationship between greater foreign participation and liquidity also appears to hold in the ASEAN5 region.
One reason why foreign participation tends to improve liquidity has to do with the nature of the foreign participants. Many of these are hedge funds, whose presence in emerging markets is expanding rapidly. From 2003 to 2010 assets under management by hedge funds dedicated to investing in emerging markets increased nine-fold to $95 billion.
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Hedge funds are subject to few restrictions on their investment strategies. For example, they are not constrained by country ratings and thus can invest in countries with sub-investment grade ratings and even in countries that are not rated. Moreover, their use of leverage and more frequent trading amplifies their impact on trading volumes, especially in emerging market countries where they have tended to be both the early and larger players. Unsurprisingly, then, the Committee on Global Financial System (2007) estimated that hedge funds account for about 45 percent of trading volume in local emerging market debt.
Finally, greater foreign participation will create a virtuous circle that will expand the size of the debt markets themselves. As interest rates fall and liquidity improves, more firms will find it attractive to issue. And as more firms issue and market size grows, more investors will be enticed to participate. This will only reinforce the utility of the market as a spare tire. Since bond maturities are typically of longer duration than bank loans, the more ASEAN5 corporates shift to bond finance, the better their underlying liquidity situation will be, as they will have secured financing for longer periods. Consequently, they will face fewer difficulties if and when credit stops again. In other words, greater bond market development would not only ensure that the financial system will have a spare tire in case of another crisis. It will also give corporates a spare tire -greater liquidity -that it can use as insurance, even before the crisis takes place.
B. Potential Costs
What are the potential costs to bond markets of this increased foreign participation? To begin with, inflows into the bond market can complicate the conduct of monetary policy. Some of the problems are well-known, as they apply to any type of capital inflows, including the equity and bank inflows with which ASEAN5 countries are long familiar. But some of the complications are new. In particular, if inflows are channeled into domestic government bonds, then long-term rates will be affected. It is difficult to say, a priori, whether this helps or hinders central bank operations. To the extent that bond markets become more liquid, and attuned to central bank signals regarding future interest rates (as opposed to being dominated by institutional investors which need to buy longterm assets to match their liabilities) then transmission mechanisms could be improved. However, to the extent that yield curves become dominated by developments elsewhere in the world then monetary independence will be reduced. Indeed, during 2010 ASEAN5 countries were confronted with flattening yield curves --the "Greenspan dilemma" of the mid-2000s: even as some countries raised short-term rates, foreign purchases were causing long-term rates to fall.
Another potential risk is greater interest rate volatility.
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Surges in foreign inflows are often followed by sudden withdrawals, as ASEAN discovered in 1997. More recently, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, net capital inflows to emerging markets suddenly shifted into reverse as portfolio capital started to flow out of these countries, a process which continued for the next two quarters. Then, in the second quarter of 2009 following extraordinary macroeconomic easing and policy support to shore up advanced country banking systems, capital inflows resumed, quickly reaching 2006 levels. For ASEAN countries the adjustment was even more profound, as inflows turned negative for three quarters and then recovered much more slowly.
Assessing the implications of these swings in capital flows, however, is far from straightforward. After Lehman, the volatility of debt market returns increased sharply in some ASEAN5 countries, especially Indonesia, which has a particularly high level of foreign participation. But volatility also increased in countries with low foreign shares, while rising only minimally in Singapore, the most open of all the five countries. In fact, the increase in volatility was correlated much more closely with the degree of market development than it was with foreign participation. Perhaps this is because countries with a greater institutional footprint in local currency debt were better able to temper the effects from foreign short-term investors scaling down their exposures to the region.
Even if foreign participation and yield volatility are related in the short run, over the longer term, the relationship may be much weaker -or even non-existent. That's because, as Prasad and Rajan (2008) have noted, foreign participation can actually be a stabilizing force for local markets. Foreign investors frequently exert pressure for more transparency which reduces price volatility because it improves the quality and increases the frequency of information. Such changes reduce the risk that there will be sudden disclosures of accumulated negative news. Moreover, in cases where they do occur, foreign participation attenuates the price impact, because it broadens what would otherwise have been a thinner market. In fact, a cross-sectional analysis of 10 emerging markets with significant foreign participation in the local currency government bond market found no clear correlation between foreign participation and bond price volatility over 2000-09. 22 Finally, there are some concerns that bond flows are more prone to destabilizing reversals than investments in equities, presumably because the stronger domestic repricing of equities endogenously moderates outflow pressures. Yet the empirical evidence that bond flows are more volatile than equities is weak.
That said, risks from bond flow volatility remain significant, for several reasons:  Surging bond yields can cause considerable domestic dislocation, arguably far more than falling equity prices. Is there a way to secure the longer-term benefits of greater foreign participation, while reducing the potential short term volatility costs? Again, because the demise of "original sin" is so recent, there is little international experience that can be drawn upon for lessons. One potentially significant measure was taken by Indonesia in July 2010. At that time, foreign investment had been pouring into SBIs (central bank securities), in part because of carry-trade activity by hedge funds, in which investors borrow in currencies such as the U.S. dollar where interest rates are low in order to invest in currencies such as the rupiah, where interest rates are high. Since these investments are financed using borrowed money, investors are forced to liquidate their positions whenever funding costs rise or financing conditions change. That means that such investments can be volatile. To reduce the attendant risks, Indonesia imposed a one-month holding period on SBIs, applicable to domestic and foreign holders. In principle, this measure should circumscribe the scope for foreign outflows when global risk aversion rises, since investors will no longer be able to exit their SBI positions quickly. Precisely for that reason, it should also discourage short term carry trade inflows in the first place.
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The question is how effective the measure will prove in practice. So far, there's no evidence that it has affected aggregate foreign holdings of Indonesian securities, which initially fell but then quickly reversed course, surpassing their July level on their way to reaching new heights. Nor is it clear how well the measure will succeed in limiting outflows, since investors wish to exit their positions, they could hedge them by selling other Indonesia assets.
There may also be some unanticipated side effects. For example, the associated decision to eliminate the 3-month SBI appears to have impeded the development of the nascent interest rate swap market by eliminating its 23 Investors have also been attracted by the expectation that regional currencies will appreciate.
24 Holding restrictions could also discourage investments by ordinary long-only open-ended mutual fund because daily redemptions require the ability to sell securities. benchmark rate. (Central bank term deposits exist, but may not be an adequate substitute because they are not traded.) Consequently, it may take some time before the measure can be properly assessed.
C. Dealing with Off-shore Activity
The rise of foreign interest in domestic bonds has another important ramification: growing off-shore activity. Foreign investors are increasingly obtaining exposure to emerging markets by using various "access products", such as over the counter derivatives, structured securities, or offshore special purpose vehicles. Modes of access include innovative financial instruments such as non-deliverable forwards and other derivative instruments, including credit-linked notes. Partly as a result of these activities, derivatives transactions with emerging market assets as underlying have exploded in recent years.
Why do foreign investors transact off-shore? In part, because there are advantages to doing so. For example, by staying off-shore they can assume counterparty risk vis-a-vis a few familiar developed market financial institutions, avoiding the need for dealing with (and conducting extensive due diligence on) a variety of less familiar firms from a multitude of emerging market countries. But investors also stay offshore because there are impediments or costs to entering the onshore markets.
Impediments can come in a variety of forms, such as:
25  Limits on access to money market or other short-term instruments.
 Clearing and settlement protocols and custody arrangements, such as custody controls, directed settlement, and rules on sub-custody. The cost of appointing a local custodian can make cross-border investments unattractive.  Minimum holding periods.
Does any of this matter?
It does, for several reasons. Controls and taxes that drive activity off-shore fragment the market and reduce liquidity on-shore, thereby impairing price discovery. In other words, they reduce efficiency. They also reduce transparency. For example, with much of the activity taking place beyond their jurisdiction, in relatively opaque over-the-counter markets, national authorities will find it difficult to monitor market developments. They will also have difficulty assessing the investor base, since domestic data on foreign ownership will no longer be a good indicator of the actual level of foreign participation, particularly for the hedge funds and proprietary trading desks that typically use access products. Indeed, a significant proportion of bonds owned by the domestic financial sector may actually be held on behalf of foreign investors (typically by onshore banks) through derivative structures.
A shift towards offshore activity may also raise prudential concerns. Offshore markets may be less regulated, and in any case will not be regulated by the home authorities. Moreover, even though controls might exist that aim to isolate domestic markets from those offshore, inevitably firms find ways to arbitrage between the two. As a result, developments in markets offshore can be transmitted onshore. In that case, compensating policy action might prove difficult because national authorities may not have much information on the genesis or the nature of the underlying shock. This is a particular concern since the leverage that underlies access instruments can be an important driver of market volatility.
For all these reasons, over time it may be beneficial to try to bring such markets onshore. One way to do this is by reducing or eliminating withholding taxes. Such a measure, however, would raise difficult issues of equity and efficiency. For example, if nonresidents are exempted from withholding tax, this could lead to practices such as "coupon washing", where bonds are sold over the coupon payment period -perhaps via repo -to investors paying low or zero withholding tax. Alternatively, resident investors may begin to route purchases through offshore routes to avoid or reduce the cost of withholding tax. On the other hand, if withholding tax on bonds is abolished for all, residents and non-residents alike, then this might create a distortion favoring bond markets over equity markets.
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the past decade, exceptional efforts by country authorities to expand ASEAN5's bond markets have been undercut by broader macroeconomic trends. Firms have had very little need to issue, since they have dramatically improved their profitability, while reducing their investment ratios. As their cashflows have improved, they have used the spare funds to reduce their leverage -that is, to pay down their debts, rather than to borrow more. Meanwhile, on the demand side, the domestic investor base has grown, but until recently foreigners have remained reluctant to purchase local currency bonds.
Recently, however, one of these trends has turned decisively. Foreigners have become increasingly willing, even enthusiastic, about buying domestic bonds. Their funding has already enabled ASEAN5 bond markets to act as a spare tire for the domestic financial system to, provide finance to companies during a period where banks remained reluctant to lend. As this new trend continues, bond markets should be able to become much more than a spare tire. With foreign investors increasing the share of emerging market assets in their portfolios to match their weight in the global economy, the additional demand is likely to reduce interest rates, improve liquidity, and thereby encourage firms to issue, expanding the market size. In other words, foreign participation is likely to trigger a virtuous circle of bond market development, to the point where ASEAN could over the next decade develop the long-envisioned "twin engine" financial system.
These new trends, however, will bring new challenges in their wake. As foreign demand for emerging assets grows, capital inflows will increase, complicating the conduct of monetary policy. Volatility may increase since surges in inflows could be followed by large outflows, a risk that may be particularly large because so much of the portfolio inflows could be leveraged, and so are particularly sensitive to changes in global risk aversion. Finally, the proliferation of access products, enabling investors to gain exposure to emerging market assets without buying them directly, has caused markets to develop offshore, meaning that developments in the domestic market no longer give authorities the full picture of underlying market forces.
It is too early to know how policies should respond. It will take some time for the new trends to play out. But two broad directions seem clear. Measures will be needed to deepen local capital markets further, so that financial systems can act as a better shock absorber against capital flow volatility, thereby limiting its impact on the real economy (See the companion paper, "Developing Bond Markets: What Still Needs to be Done?"). Also, it may be worthwhile trying to bring markets onshore, by removing barriers to entry, including withholding taxes.
In sum, ASEAN5's strenuous efforts of the past decade have indeed succeeded in transforming its bond markets. But the developments of the past ten years may well be dwarfed by changes that may take place in the decade ahead. Time will tell.
